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Abstract
This paper examines whether risk-taking in a lottery depends on the opportunity to
respond to the lottery outcome through additional labor effort and/or tax evasion.
Previous empirical attempts to answer this question face identification issues due
to self selection into jobs that facilitate tax evasion and labor effort flexibility.
We address these identification issues using a laboratory experiment (N = 180).
Subjects have the opportunity to invest earned income in a lottery and, depending
on randomly assigned treatment states, have the opportunity to respond to the
lottery outcome through evasion and/or extra labor effort. We find strong evidence
that ex-post access to labor opportunities reduces ex-ante risk willingness while
access to tax evasion has no effect on risk behavior. We discuss possible explanations
for this result based on the existing literature.
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1 Introduction
Although approximately 94% of households in the United States hold some type of finan-
cial asset, there is significant variation in the type and amount of financial assets held
(Bricker et al. 2012). For example, 15% of families hold stocks, 50% hold retirement
accounts, 8.7% hold pooled investment accounts and 92.5% hold transaction accounts.1
Financial asset holdings also vary greatly across individual and household characteris-
tics. While 24.5% of households headed by self-employed individuals have stocks in their
portfolios, only 13.8% of households headed by employed individuals do. Additionally,
the trends described by Bricker et al. (2012) show evidence of significant variation in risk
exposure. For example, the median amount of money invested in bonds by an employed
household is approximately eight times as much as that invested in stocks; the compara-
ble ratio for self-employed households is five. There is also evidence of variation in risk
exposure across other individual and household characteristics: age, family structure,
education level, race and income. An extensive literature in finance and economics has
been devoted to explaining these observed variations in risk exposure. Two questions
that have received a lot of attention are: how do investors decide how much of their
income to invest in risky assets and why do some individuals have greater risk exposure
than others (Heaton and Lucas 2000).
The theoretical finance literature has provided many insights into this problem.
For example, Heaton and Lucas (2000) argue that if risk decisions are driven by utility
maximizing behavior then the drivers of risk exposure can be separated into two broad
categories: risk preference and ‘circumstances’. It is clearly the case that some individ-
uals are more risk averse than others and that this variation in risk preference affects
the amount of risk to which individuals voluntarily expose themselves. ‘Circumstances’
generally refer to the future opportunities individuals know they will have access to at
the time of making risky investment decisions. These circumstances usually have two fea-
tures - flexibility and background risks - that may have opposing effects on risk exposure.
Flexibility acts as a type of insurance against adverse outcomes and is therefore predicted
to increase risk exposure (Bodie et al. 1992; Franke et al. 2011). For example, the ability
to vary labor hours or take an additional job maybe used as insurance against negative
investment outcomes and therefore increase current risk exposure. Future opportunities
with uncertain and uninsurable income also represents a type of background risk that
1These statistics are taken from the Survey of Consumer Finances. Bricker et al. (2012) provides a
detail summary of the results including definitions of the various financial assets. Transactions accounts
include checking, savings, and money market deposit accounts; money market mutual funds; and call or
cash accounts at brokerages. Retirement accounts include personally established individual retirement
accounts (IRAs) or job-based 401(k) accounts. Pooled investment funds exclude money market mutual
funds and indirectly held mutual funds and include all other types of directly held pooled investment
funds, such as traditional open-end and closed-end mutual funds, real estate investment trusts, and hedge
funds.
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may cause the current risk exposure of individuals to increase, decrease or remain un-
changed depending on the form of risk aversion (Gollier and Zeckhauser 2002). As a
result, the impact of background risk on current risk exposure remains an empirical ques-
tion. Furthermore, because future ‘circumstances’ generally include both flexibility and
background risk, which may have opposing effects on risk exposure, the impact of future
‘circumstance’ on current risk exposure is also an empirical question. Understanding the
impact of the interaction of these two characteristics is also important, but difficult to
determine in a theoretical framework.
Empirical efforts to identify the impact of circumstances produce inconclusive re-
sults. For example, Benitez-Silva (2002) tests the theory in the context of labor supply
flexibility and find that individuals who have flexible work hours tend to hold significantly
more (risky) stocks. Although this result is consistent with the theoretical work of Bodie
et al. (1992), there remains some identification concerns due to self-selection. To the ex-
tent that individuals with greater labor supply flexibility also have greater preference for
risk exposure, it is not clear that the identified effect is due to labor supply flexibility or
risk preferences.2 The empirical efforts to identify the impact of background risk is more
extensive, but the results are mixed. Although a number of studies find that the presence
of background risks reduce risk exposure, the magnitude of the effect varies (Heaton and
Lucas 2000). A more recent study by Klos (2004) find that access to a future risky in-
vestment has no effect on current risk exposure. This finding not only runs opposite the
flexibility argument, the results are also different from the results summarized in Heaton
and Lucas (2000). More importantly, the results from the existing literature suggest that
the impact of background risk depends on the source of background risk; labor income
seems to reduce risk exposure while investment income seems to have little or no effect
on risk exposure.
We contribute to this literature by identifying whether access to future labor and tax
evasion opportunities affect current risk exposure. In particular, our research question is:
Does the opportunity to earn additional labor income and/or evade taxation affect risky
asset investment? By studying these two sources of flexibility and background risk in the
same setting, we are able to cleanly identify the impact of both circumstances as well as
their interaction on risk exposure. We are also able to determine if the effects depend on
the type of circumstance. In particular, does the effect of labor income background risk
differ from the effect of tax evasion background risk?
As indicated above, answering these questions with observational data leads to
identification problems that are very difficult to overcome. Namely, it can be presumed
that individuals with a high intrinsic willingness to take risks self-select into occupations
2To our knowledge, Benitez-Silva (2002) is the only paper to study the link between labor supply
flexibility and portfolio choice empirically.
2
with greater access to tax evasion and additional labor supply opportunities such as self-
employment (Cramer et al. 2002; Hartog et al. 2002). As a result, a positive empirical
correlation between self-employment and risk willingness is difficult to interpret in a
causal manner, and is instead likely to be confounded by intrinsic, personality-based risk
willingness. For clean identification, one would ideally like to randomly assign labor
supply and tax evasion opportunities to different workers. Because this is not feasible in
the real world, we design a laboratory experiment where each subject participates in a
labor task and then makes an investment decision. Subjects are then given an opportunity
to respond to the outcome of the lottery before paying taxes. The opportunity to respond
to the outcome of the lottery depends on the group to which subjects are randomly
assigned: some subjects can evade taxes; some can supply extra labor; some can both
evade taxes and supply extra labor; and some can neither evade taxes nor supply extra
labor.
Our results show that the opportunity for labor supply and tax evasion have differ-
ent effects on risk taking and partly cancel each other. The control group, which lacked
opportunities for additional labor supply or tax evasion, invested 38% of their gross in-
come into the risky asset. Access to extra labor opportunities reduces the investment
share by approximately eleven percentage points. This represents a thirty percent de-
crease from the baseline that is statistically different from zero. Evasion opportunity has
no effect on the investment share – neither economically nor statistically. When subjects
can both supply extra labor and evade taxes, the investment share is 3.5 percentage points
lower than in the baseline treatment, but this difference is not statistically different from
zero. These results are in line with the theoretical and empirical literature on background
risk, which support a negative relationship between uninsurable future risks and current
risk exposure(Heaton and Lucas 2000). More importantly, our findings suggest that the
effect of background risk depends on the source of background risk. While labor income
uncertainty reduces risk exposure as in (Gakidis 1997), the zero tax evasion effect is in
line with Klos (2004) who finds that current risk exposure is not affected by the presence
of future independent risks.
Our paper contributes to the literature in important ways. This is the first known
study we are aware of to examine the effect of tax evasion on current risk exposure.3 Al-
though the decision to evade taxes is similar to that of other risky decisions, it may have
a different effect due to cognitive and morale biases on the part of the investor. Further-
more, it is widely accepted that access to tax evasion opportunities is heterogeneously
distributed across individuals. For example, employees who are subject to third-party re-
3Wrede (1995) theoretically analyzes the joint problem of risk taking and tax evasion in a static
economy. He, however, focuses on the effect of taxation on expected utility and does not explicitly
study the dynamic effect of evasion opportunities on initial risk behavior. He concludes that eliminating
evasion is likely to discourage risk taking.
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porting have less opportunity to evade taxes than their counterparts who are not (Kleven
et al. 2011). This difference in access to tax evasion has been shown to have an effect on
other economic outcomes that are of interest to policy makers. For example, Doerrenberg
and Duncan (2012) find evidence that workers with evasion opportunities have different
labor supply elasticities with respect to taxes than workers without access to evasion.
There is also evidence that tax evasion has both income distributional implications (Alm
and Sennoga 2011) and welfare implications (Chetty 2009; Gorodnichenko et al. 2009).
Our study contributes to this growing literature by identifying the impact of tax evasion
opportunities on risk exposure, which is it-self an important economic variable for policy
makers.
We are also the first to identify the impact of future labor supply opportunities on
current risk exposure in a laboratory setting.4 Existing studies of both labor flexibility
and labor income background risk use observational data, which faces identification issues.
Using a laboratory setting allows us to cleanly identify the impact of future labor supply
opportunities on current risk exposure. Our results also provide some insights into the
possible effect of the current incremental shift toward greater flexibility in the labor
market - flexi-week work schedules and work-from-home initiatives - on risk exposure.
We find no evidence that the added flexibility will increase risk exposure of affected
workers. On the contrary, risk exposure is likely to decrease if the added flexibility is
accompanied by greater income uncertainty. Additionally, unlike the existing literature,
we explicitly account for any possible interaction effects between labor supply and evasion
opportunities in our empirical design. Understanding this interaction effect is especially
important given that labor flexibility is often bundled with tax evasion opportunities.
The results are also important and timely given a number of other recent develop-
ments. For example, the increased scrutiny of offshore bank accounts imply reduced tax
evasion opportunities for many high income individuals. Although this change may to
lead to higher tax revenues, we show that it is unlikely to affect risk exposure.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design. We
briefly discuss theoretical considerations in section 3 and present results in section 4.
Our findings are discussed in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
2 The Laboratory Experiment
Considering the empirical challenges and the impracticality of the ideal field experiment,
we employ a laboratory experiment to study the effect of tax evasion and labor supply
opportunities on risky investment behavior. The experimental design used to answer
4Unlike Klos and Weber (2006) who analyze a portfolio-choice setting with exogenous income that
was either certain or risky, we explore a case where labor-income risk is endogenous.
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our research question is based on widely-accepted experimental designs in the fields of
risk behavior (Gneezy and Potters 1997; Thaler et al. 1997; Klos et al. 2005), tax
evasion (Alm 2012) and labor supply (Charness and Kuhn 2011). Although the laboratory
environment is artificial, we argue that a clean and clear experiment design, such as ours,
allows for causal identification of treatment effects.5
2.1 Experimental Design
We design a one-shot experiment with between-subject variation to answer our research
question. The experiment has three stages. First, subjects complete a real-effort task
for which they earn experimental currency units (ECU). Second, subjects decide how
much of their labor earnings to invest in a risky lottery. Finally, subjects are given an
opportunity to respond to the lottery outcome before paying taxes on their income.
The first two stages are identical for all subjects and we solely vary how subjects can
respond to the lottery outcome in the third stage. Depending on which of four treatment
groups a subject is assigned to, she either has i) no opportunity to respond, or she has the
opportunity to respond through ii) additional labor effort, iii) a tax reporting decision, or
iv) both extra labor effort and tax reporting. Hence, we cross two dichotomous factors,
“evasion opportunity” and “labor-supply opportunity”, in a 2x2 fully-factorial design.
The following section describes each of the three experimental stages in greater detail
and highlights our identification strategy.
The Labor-Task Stage Every subject first completes a labor task that involves mov-
ing a set of sliders across a computer screen (Gill and Prowse 2012).6 The sliders are
initially positioned at zero and can be repositioned to any integer between 0 and 100,
inclusive. Subjects are given two and a half minutes (150 seconds) to align 48 sliders at
position 50. Subjects receive instant feedback on the position of the current slider only;
this is indicated at the rightmost end of each slider. We disable the arrow keys on the
key board to ensure the subjects only use the left mouse key to complete the task; use of
the arrow keys makes the task trivial. Additionally “... no two sliders are aligned exactly
one under the other” (Gill and Prowse 2012). This design feature prevents subjects from
positioning one slider at 50 and then visually matching the other sliders at this position.
Subjects are paid an exogenously determined piece rate, which is fixed at 2.5 ECU for
5We provide a thorough discussion of the external validity of our experimental design and results in
section 5.3.
6See figure 3 in the appendix for a screenshot of the task. Gill and Prowse (2013a) provide details
and show how to implement the slider task. It has been used widely since its introduction: Gill and
Prowse (2013b), Riener and Wiederhold (2011), Cettolin and Riedl (2011), Gill and Prowse (2012),
and Hammermann et al. (2012). Djawadi and Fahr (2012) also use the slider task in the context of
tax compliance, but examine a different research question than we do and employ compliance as the
dependent variable.
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each correctly-aligned slider. We used an exchange rate of 5 ECU to 1 EUR. Therefore,
each subject earned 0.5 EUR for each correctly aligned slider.
The slider task has a number of advantages that are described in Gill and Prowse
(2012). It is easy to explain and implement, does not require prior knowledge, does
not allow guessing, and most importantly, is identical across treatments and subjects.
Although the number of correctly aligned sliders has been used as a measure of labor
effort in the labor literature, our primary objective here is to induce a sense of ownership
of income and the possibility to consider labor income as a potential background risk. We
argue that participants are more likely to make reasonable and “realistic” decisions in a
situation with endogenous incomes, relative to a situation with an exogenous endowment.
Furthermore, individual variability in outcomes suggests that labor income may be viewed
as uncertain. Subjects perform one full round of the slider task as an unincentivized
practice round to familiarize themselves with the task.
Investment Stage Subjects are given an opportunity to invest a share of their labor
earnings in a lottery after completing the labor task. They are allowed to invest any
amount between zero and their total labor earnings in the lottery. The lottery is binary
and the amount invested in the lottery is either doubled or halved with equal probability.
The actual outcome of the lottery is determined by the throw of a ten sided die. One
of the experimenters walks up to each subject’s booth after the investment decision is
complete and throws a ten sided die. The amount invested in the lottery is doubled if the
number on the face of the die is less than or equal to five, and halved if the number on
the face of the die is greater than or equal to six. The experimenter enters the number
on the face of the die on the computer and the subject verifies that the number is correct
before hitting enter. The computer then reports the outcome of the lottery to the subject
along with her post-lottery income.7
The lottery is designed such that the expected pay-off is greater than the invested
amount, i.e., the expected return is positive, which implies that a risk-averse person
invests a strictly positive share of his wealth into the lottery. The binary structure and
the conditional investment outcomes are easy to grasp and calculate. However, we also
provided a computerized calculator at every decision stage.
Response to the Lottery Outcome (Treatment Groups) The next stage of the
experiment gives subjects an opportunity to respond to the outcome of the lottery. Re-
call that our research objective is to determine whether an individual’s risk exposure
is affected by opportunities to respond to the outcome of risky decisions via tax-evasion
and/or labor-supply opportunities. Therefore, we randomly assign subjects to four groups
7Note that the experimenter could at no point see the amount invested by the subject as the feedback
screen was only shown after the experimenter went on and the subject clicked the “next” button.
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that are identical in every way except in how they can respond to the outcome of the
lottery. Following the 2x2 crossing, the four cells read as follows: Some subjects have no
opportunity to respond, i.e., they can neither supply extra labor nor evade taxes; some
subjects can supply extra labor; some subjects can evade taxes; and finally, some can
both evade taxes and supply extra labor. In other words, a subject’s ability to respond
to the outcome of the lottery depends on which of the following groups she is randomly
assigned to:
• Baseline: Subjects in the baseline group do not have an opportunity to respond to
the outcome of the lottery. After the lottery outcome is realized, their total income
is taxed at a proportional rate of 30 percent, and they are simply informed of their
final payoff (their net income). The tax rate is fixed exogenously, and is the same
for all subjects and all groups. Therefore, subjects in the baseline treatment cannot
respond to the lottery. This group serves as the control treatment.
• Labor: After the outcome of the lottery is determined, subjects in the labor treat-
ment play another round (90 seconds) of the real-effort task and thereby earn
additional income. After this second round of supplying labor effort, their total
income is taxed and subjects are informed of their final payoff (their net income).
Therefore, subjects in the labor treatment can respond to the lottery only through
a second labor supply choice.
• Evasion: In the evasion treatment, subjects have to make a tax reporting decision.
After they learn the outcome of the lottery, participants are asked how much income
they wish to report for tax purposes. As is standard in the experimental tax evasion
literature, there is an exogenous probability that the tax evasion decision is audited,
and a penalty applies in the case of audit and underreporting. After the reporting
decision has been made, the audit status is determined and the payoff (net income)
is paid accordingly. Therefore, subjects in the evasion treatment can respond to
the lottery only through their reporting decision.
• Full: Subjects in the full treatment group have two channels to respond to the
lottery outcome. They play another round of the real effort task (90 seconds), as
in the labor group, and then make an income reporting decision, as in the evasion
group. Their final payoff (net income) is a function of the two rounds of labor
supply, the investment decision, the lottery outcome, the reporting decision, and
the audit status. Therefore, subjects in this fourth treatment group have access to
two channels to respond to the lottery outcome: evasion and labor supply.
Subjects are only informed of the set-up of the experiment in their treatment state,
and they receive this information prior to the initial labor supply and investment decisions
7
(in the paper based instructions). Therefore, subjects know ex ante whether and how
they are able to respond to the lottery outcome, and that they can only respond ex post.
Tax and Audit Mechanism As indicated above, all subjects face an exogenously
determined proportional marginal tax rate of 30 percent.8 Additionally, subjects in the
evasion and full treatments face an exogenous audit probability of 10 percent and a
penalty that is equal to twice any evaded taxes due (i.e., a fine rate of 2). The audit
outcome is determined by the throw of a 10-sided die; subjects are audited if the number
one is shown on the face of the die.9 Audit leads to the discovery of true income, and
subjects who underreport their income pay a penalty equal to twice their evaded taxes
(i.e., the underreported amount multiplied by twice the tax rate). All other subjects
who either report honestly or underreport but throw a die number between two and ten
receive a net income equal to their true gross income less the tax rate multiplied by the
reported income. This audit and penalty structure is commonly used in the tax evasion
literature (Alm et al. 2009). In order to make the tax reporting decision as realistic as
possible, we include an exogenous audit risk and donate all tax revenues and fines to the
administrative governing body of the City of Cologne, Germany.10
We argue that this is the cleanest experimental design to answer the research ques-
tion posed above: a one-shot game in a between-subject design that produces 180 inde-
pendent observations (45 per treatment) on a metric dependent variable. We are therefore
guaranteed sufficient statistical power to answer our research question. All participants
face the same labor effort, investment decision, and marginal tax rates, and therefore
only differ with respect to the channel that is available to respond to the lottery outcome
ex post. This allows us to compare the share of income invested in the lottery across the
four groups and attribute any differences to the difference in response opportunities. Ad-
ditionally, since subjects know ex ante whether and how they are able to respond to the
lottery outcome, and that they can only respond ex post, any treatment effect we iden-
tify must be driven purely by anticipation of the response opportunity. Methodologically,
this is achieved by changing only that part of the instructions governing second-period
8Because subjects in the baseline and the labor treatment do not make an income reporting decision,
they pay 30 percent on their total income in taxes. On the other hand, subjects in the evasion and full
treatment groups pay a tax rate of 30 percent on their reported income because they are able to respond
to the lottery outcome by underreporting income.
9The procedure was as follows: After the reporting decision was complete for the evasion and full
treatment groups, one of the experimenters walked up to each computer booth and threw a 10-sided
die; the experimenter entered the number on the face of the die on the computer; the subject confirmed
this number, which results in a screen with one of the following sentences: You have been audited or
You have not been audited. The subject had to press “ENTER” again to see the screen summarizing the
round’s payment. By this time the experimenter had already moved on to the next subject. Hence, the
experimenter could at no point see subjects’ reported share.
10Subjects received a copy of the donation receipt (stating the total amount donated) via e-mail after
the experiment has been conducted. This procedure was also explicitly stated in the instructions.
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opportunities; the first period is identical across instructions.
2.2 Organization
The experiment was conducted in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER),
University of Cologne, Germany. A random sample of the laboratory’s subject pool of ap-
proximately 4000 persons was invited via email – using the recruitment software ORSEE
(Greiner 2004) – to participate in the experiment. Potential participants signed up on a
first-come-first-serve basis. A total of 180 subjects, mostly undergraduate students from
the University of Cologne, participated in the experiment (see section 4.1 for summary
statistics). Neither the content of the experiment nor the expected payoff were stated
in the invitation email. The computerized experiment was programmed utilizing z-tree
software (Fischbacher 2007).
We conducted twelve sessions over three regular school days in May and June 2013.11
Each session included one practice round, one paying round, 15 subjects, and lasted
approximately 40 minutes on average (including review of instructions and payment of
participants). The exchange rate between Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and Euro
was such that five ECU corresponded to one Euro. Random assignment to computer
booths was implemented by asking each subject to draw an ID number out of a box upon
entering the lab. The decisions and payments of the subjects were linked to their ID and
the experimenter had no way of matching this information to their names. Subjects also
received a hard copy of the instructions when they entered the lab (See appendix D) and
were allowed as much time as they needed to familiarize themselves with the procedure
of the experiment. They were then given the opportunity to ask any clarifying questions
in private.
3 Theoretical Background
In this section, we discuss the conditions under which the opportunity to react to the
investment outcome in the future affects the current exposure to investment risks. Agents
maximize the expected utility of terminal wealth given disutility of effort, i.e., working.
Agents have direct utility function u which is strictly increasing and strictly concave in
wealth z. Effort causes increasing and convex costs c. We consider a two-period economy.
In the first period, the agent is endowed with an initial endowment w0 and can work
to gain additional income. Subsequently, he decides how much of his total period-one
wealth to invest in a risk-free storage and how much to invests in a risky asset. The
11There are two regular semesters at the tertiary level in Germany; winter semester lasting from Octo-
ber to March and Summer Semester between April and July. Therefore, the experiment was implemented
during the regular lecture season.
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risk-free rate is zero. The risky asset has a random return r˜ distributed according to the
cumulative distribution function F (r) with EF r˜ > 0.
In the second period, the agent learns the realization of r˜. Depending on the
treatment, he either has different opportunities to further increase his wealth or not.
Final gross wealth is subject to taxation at rate 0 < t < 1. To increase his wealth, the
agent can either work again for additional income, or he can evade taxes by underreporting
his true final wealth, or both.
3.1 The Baseline Problem without Adjustment Opportunities
We begin by characterizing the agent’s optimal action when he has no adjustment op-
portunities in period two. The agent faces the following static objective:
max
l1,a
EFu((w0 +wl1−a)τ +a(1 + r˜)τ)− c(l1) = max
l1,a
EFu(w0τ +wτl1 +aτ r˜)− c(l1), (1)
where w > 0 is the wage rate per unit of work, lt is the units worked in period
t = 1, 2, and a ≥ 0 is the absolute amount invested in the risky asset. For brevity, we
write τ = 1− t > 0.
It is well-known that an agent invests a positive fraction of his wealth in the risky
asset due the positive expectation of excess returns (e.g., Gollier 2001). Call the solution
to the static problem without adjustment opportunities aNoAdjust.
We now turn to the conditions under which adjustment opportunities in the sec-
ond period leads to increased or decreased risk taking in the first period. That is, the
conditions under which adjustment opportunities increase or decrease a. For this, it is
sufficient to show that these opportunities reduce (increase) the agent’s risk aversion,
or increase (reduce) his risk tolerance, respectively, in the first-period problem. More
specifically, the agent’s value function v in the dynamic problem has to be less (more)
concave than the direct utility function u in the sense of Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964).
3.2 The Dynamic Problem with Adjustment Opportunities
Consider an agent who faces the same first-period portfolio choice as in the baseline
problem but knows that he will have an adjustment opportunity in the subsequent period.
The discussion of his optimal investment results from backward induction.
In the second period, the investment return realizes and the agent observes the
resulting wealth z ≡ z(l1, a; r). Hence, the set of outcomes from first-period decisions is
entirely captured by the resulting wealth z which is the state variable in the dynamic
problem. In period two, the agent may now respond to the realization of z. Consequently,
the agent decides on units of work, l2, or the amount of wealth evaded, e, i.e., the amount
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of non-reported income, or both.
Future income with positive variance may serve as an insurance against adverse
current investment outcomes but can also be seen as a background risk relative to the
current period-one risk. Hence, it depends on the shape of risk aversion and risk toler-
ance, respectively, whether first-period risk taking is actually increased in the presence
of adjustment opportunities or whether the agent chooses to be less exposed to current
investment risk.
3.2.1 Labor Supply Opportunity
We first examine how the opportunity to adjust labor supply in the second period affects
risk taking in the first period. The opportunity to supply additional labor represents the
ability to respond to the risky investment outcome by additional effort. For each unit of
work, l2, the agent receives wage w but also suffers costs c(l2).
Bodie et al. (1992) and Franke et al. (2011) show that under non-stochastic income,
agents increase their risky investment. Intuitively, a certain way to increase income ex-
post serves as a kind of insurance towards adverse investment outcomes. The agent
knows that he will be able to offset potential losses. Non-stochastic income substitutes
the risk-free storage and the agent invests a larger fraction of his wealth in the risky asset.
Note, however, that income in our experiment is not unambiguously predictable.
Given the real-effort task utilized in the experiment, it is hard for the subjects to antic-
ipate their productivity in the second period. As we will show later, subjects exhibit a
large variability in their performance. This limits their ability to forecast to what extent
they will be able to offset potential losses. We capture this uncertainty by allowing the
agent to tremble, i.e., we add some noise, η˜ ∼ G(η), to his effort choice.
Hence, in period 2, the investor has the following value function
vl2 = max
l2
EGu(zτ + wτ(l2 + η˜))− c(l2). (2)
The first-period problem is hence given by
max
l1,a
EFv
l2(w1 + ar˜)− c(l1). (3)
Call the solution to the dynamic problem with labor-supply opportunity aLabor. The
difference between the first-period problem without adjustment opportunities (1) and (3)
is that the agent now maximizes a different objective function. He will invest more in
the risky asset, i.e., aLabor > aNoAdjust, if his value function is less concave than his direct
utility function. On the other hand, if his value function is more concave, he will reduce
his risk exposure in period one, i.e., aLabor > aNoAdjust.
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Note that making the agent tremble is equivalent to adding an uncertain non-market
component to the overall income.12 Uncertain non-market wealth has two effects. First,
if the minimum income is bounded away from zero and the variance of this income is
sufficiently small, agents should again invest more in the risky asset in the first period
(Franke et al. 2011), i.e., aLabor > aNoAdjust. This is one likely scenario for the perfor-
mance in the real-effort task. The amount of labor income available from second-round
performance varies but can be considered non-negative. However, Franke et al. 2011 also
note that this result may not hold if the variance of income is sufficiently large.
Second, consider an agent having problems generating income in the labor task. He
will not only generate very low income but he will also have highly convex costs in doing
so. Combined, this may yield negative overall utility as marginal costs exceed marginal
earnings. Hence, it is possible that for some agents the labor task may actually bear the
risk of achieving negative utility though it has a positive expectation in general. Franke
et al. 2011 show that in this case risk aversion is range dependent. The more likely a
bad performance is, the more risk averse the agent becomes as he tries to avoid negative
utility.
3.2.2 Evasion Opportunity
We now examine how the opportunity to evade taxes in the second period affects the
agent’s first-period exposure to investment risks. The opportunity to evade taxes rep-
resents the ability to respond to the risky investment outcome by taking an additional
risk. We write the tax evasion decision as a second-period portfolio choice in the spirit of
Allingham and Sandmo (1972). This allows us to apply the results of Gollier (2001) and
Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002) to characterize the conditions under which an additional
risk induces more or less risk taking.
One unit of evaded taxes yields a random return ˜ distributed according to (p,−ζ; 1−
p, 0), i.e., the tax reporting decision is audited with probability p > 0 and the fine rate is
ζ > 0. Starting in the second period, the agent has the following value function
ve(z) = maxEPu(zτ + eξ˜), (4)
where ξ˜ ∼ P (ξ) = (p, t − ζ; 1 − p, t) is the excess return per unit of evaded taxes. We
model the parameters such that EP ξ˜ > 0.
By backward induction, in period one, the agent now chooses the amount invested
12To see this write zτ +wτ(l2 + η˜) = zτ +wτl2 +wτη˜. The last term is a random component of wealth
that does neither depend on the agent’s choices nor on the investment return realization.
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in the risky asset that solves the following objective
max
a
EFv
e(w0 + ar˜)− c(l1). (5)
Call the solution to the dynamic problem with tax-evasion opportunity aEvasion. Again,
the agent will invest more in the risky asset,i.e., aEvasion > aNoAdjust if his value function
is less concave than his direct utility function and vice versa.
Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002) show that the opportunity to take an additional risk
ex-post leads to more risk taking ex-ante if and only if absolute risk tolerance is convex.
Their proposition applies if the second risk has a binary support which holds for our
assumption on the auditing mechanism. Note that it is sufficient to assume that risk
aversion is concave for a tax-evasion opportunity to induce more risk taking.13
Whether risk tolerance is actually convex or concave is an empirical question. Gol-
lier and Zeckhauser (2002) list several empirical observations leading to arguments for
either form. Hence, it remains an empirical question whether a subsequent risky decision
leads to more risk taking initially. Note that the standard assumption in macroeconomics
and finance postulates a linear risk tolerance. Given linearity, a second-period risk does
not affect the optimal exposure to first-period risks. Hence, myopic investment decisions
are optimal (Mossin 1968).
The theoretical results discussed above suggest that the effect of ‘circumstances’
on risk exposure is ambiguous. This ambiguity extends to the case with both evasion
and labor supply opportunities. Therefore, we rely on an empirical analysis to identify
the effects of ex-post opportunities on risk exposure. The results from this analysis are
reported in the next section.
4 Results
In this section, we first present summary statistics (section 4.1) and simple non-parametric
comparisons of the four treatment groups (4.2), before we proceed to regression results
in section 4.3.
4.1 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for demographic and attitudinal variables which were surveyed through
a questionnaire at the end of the experiment are presented in Table 1. The demographic
13Concave risk aversion implies convex risk tolerance and therewith increased risk taking. However,
Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002) state the proposition in terms of risk tolerance as this is more useful
because they note that risk aversion cannot be decreasing, concave and positive everywhere. As Gollier
(2001) notes, the convexity of risk tolerance is rather a restriction on risk aversion not to be too concave.
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variables include age, gender and native language. Because our experiment involves mak-
ing investment and evasion decisions, we ask one question on risk aversion14 and one on
tax morale.15
The summary statistics reported in Table 1 shows that males and native German
speakers make up 42% and 79% of the sample, respectively, and that the average age is
24.4 years. Randomization into treatment groups worked mostly well as the variables are
fairly balanced across treatment groups. Since the share of males is about 9 percentage
points lower in the baseline treatment relative to the average share, we provide regression
results that control for demographic variables to ensure that our results are not driven
by differences in gender or other individual characteristics.
Table 1: Summary Statistics by Treatment Status: Demographic and Attitudinal Vari-
ables
Control Treatments
Group Labor Evasion Full Total
Age 25.22 23.22 24.47 24.64 24.39
(6.842) (2.779) (3.546) (7.371) (5.512)
Male 0.333 0.422 0.467 0.489 0.428
(0.477) (0.499) (0.505) (0.506) (0.496)
German 0.711 0.756 0.889 0.800 0.789
(0.458) (0.435) (0.318) (0.405) (0.409)
Tax Morale 7.711 7.289 6.689 6.800 7.122
(2.427) (2.873) (2.670) (3.005) (2.760)
Risk 1.200 1.244 1.311 1.222 1.244
(0.505) (0.609) (0.668) (0.599) (0.594)
Notes: Reported is the mean of demographic and attitudinal variables by treatment status.
Standard deviations in parentheses. N = 180. Subjects in the Labor and Evasion treatments
had the opportunity to supply extra effort and evade taxes, respectively. Full treatment
indicates that both labor and evasion adjustments were available. Subjects in the control group
had no adjustment opportunities. All information were surveyed through a questionnaire at
the end of the experiment.
4.2 Non-parametric Comparisons of Treatment Groups
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the choice variables: Labor effort, investment
decision and compliance behavior. In the following, we compare the treatment groups
14The measure of risk aversion is obtained by asking subjects to choose between a certain pay-off of
$50 and a gamble that pays $100 with probability of 0.5 and $0 with probability of 0.5.
15The tax morale question is adopted from World Values Survey (Inglehart nd). “Please tell me for
the following statement whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something
in between: ‘Cheating on taxes if you have the chance’.” This is the most frequently used question to
measure tax morale in observational studies (e.g., Slemrod 2003, Alm and Torgler 2006, and Halla 2012).
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with respect to these variables.
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Treatment Status: Choice Variables
Control Treatments
Group Labor Evasion Full Total
Effort Practice 13.31 13.51 12.69 13.47 13.24
(4.547) (5.968) (4.828) (4.998) (5.081)
Effort Round 1 17.78 18.44 17.51 17.96 17.92
(4.680) (4.429) (4.841) (4.472) (4.583)
Effort Round 2 . 12.20 . 11.47 11.83
(3.259) (2.951) (3.113)
Investment share 0.381 0.271 0.375 0.346 0.343
(0.297) (0.206) (0.267) (0.279) (0.266)
Share Reported . . 0.141 0.309 0.225
(0.248) (0.401) (0.342)
Notes: Reported is the mean of choice variables by treatment status. Standard deviations in
parentheses. N = 180. Subjects in the Labor and Evasion treatments had the opportunity
to supply extra effort and evade taxes, respectively. Full treatment indicates that both labor
and evasion adjustments were available. Subjects in the control group had no adjustment
opportunities.
Effort decisions On average, over all treatment groups, roughly 18 sliders were cor-
rectly positioned in the first payoff relevant round. Table 2 shows that, labor effort
is fairly balanced across the four treatment groups. Though slightly higher in the labor
treatment relative to the other groups, this difference in correctly positioned sliders in the
first round is not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test relative to control group:
p = 0.4914). The slight difference in round 2 effort between the two groups that have the
opportunity to respond to the lottery outcome by working is not significant either.16
Investment decisions Our main variable of interest is the share of round-one income
invested in the lottery, which we simply refer to as investment share. This variable is
presented in the fourth row of Table 2 as well as in Figure 1. We observe that the share
of round-one income that is invested in the lottery is 38.1% in the baseline, 27.1% in
the labor treatment, 37.5% in the evasion treatment, and 34.6% in the full treatment.
There is no statistically significant difference in the investment share between the baseline
and evasion treatment (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.88). Though the investment share in
the full treatment is approximately four percentage points lower than the baseline, this
difference is not statistically different from zero either (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.66).
16Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix show the distribution of correctly positioned sliders in each treatment
group.
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On the other hand, we observe a large treatment effect in the labor treatment; the
investment share is eleven percentage points lower relative to the baseline. This treatment
effect is both economically large and statistical different from zero (Mann-Whitney test:
p < 0.066).
Our results therefore suggest that the opportunity to provide extra labor effort
after learning the outcome of the lottery (ex-post) reduces subjects’ willingness to take
on investment risk (ex-ante). This effect is almost fully countered if these subjects also
have an opportunity to evade taxes. Curiously, subjects whose only response to the
investment outcome is to evade taxes are no more or less risky than subjects without
response opportunities. The fact that the investment decisions of subjects in the control
and evasion groups are close to each other (given that the choice variable is metric between
0 and 1) shows that the significant difference between the labor and control group is very
high and reflects a causal treatment effect.
Figure 1: Investment Share by Treatment Group
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Notes: Reported is the share of round 1 labor income that is invested in the lottery by treatment
status. N = 180. Subjects in Labor and Evasion treatments had the opportunity to supply extra effort
and evade taxes, respectively. Full treatment indicates that both labor and evasion adjustments were
available. Subjects in the control group had no adjustment opportunities.
Compliance behavior Additional insights come from examining the compliance be-
havior in the two groups with the opportunity to underreport. On average, subjects
in these two groups reported 22.5% of their income for tax purposes. However, there
are large differences between the two groups as can be seen in Figure 2; while subjects
in the evasion treatment reported, on average, 14% of their income, subjects in the
full treatment group were more honest and reported almost 31% of their income. This
17 percentage points difference is statistically different from zero (Mann-Whitney test:
16
p < 0.0871).
Figure 2: Reporting Behavior by Treatment Group
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Notes: Reported is the share of income that is reported for tax purposes by treatment group. N = 90.
Subjects in Evasion treatment had evasion adjustment opportunities. Full treatment indicates that both
labor and evasion adjustments were available.
4.3 Regression Results
This section describes parametric results based on the following regression model:
ψig = α + β · Treatg + φ ·Xig + ig, (6)
where subscripts indicate a subject i who is in treatment group g = 0, 1, 2, 3 (with g = 0:
control, g = 1: labor treatment, g = 2: evasion treatment, g = 3: full treatment).
The dependent variable ψig is the share of round 1 labor income that is invested in
the lottery. Treatg is a categorical indicator variable for a subject’s treatment group
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and β is the coefficient of interest. The coefficients for each treatment group will be
relative to the omitted control group with g = 0. Some specifications also control for
demographic and attitudinal variables that are captured in Xig. i is an error term; we
use heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
Specification (I) of Table 3 shows OLS estimates of the effect of treatment status on
the share of invested income. The estimated treatment effects confirm our non-parametric
analysis. The investment share of subjects who have the opportunity to provide additional
labor effort is 10 to 11 percentage points lower than the control group. This effect is
17Recall that we employ a between-subjects design where each subject is exclusively in one of the four
treatment groups.
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large and statistically significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, the investment
share of subjects in the evasion and full treatment groups is not statistically different
from that of the control group. These results are robust to the inclusion of demographic
and attitudinal variables in specification (II); age, gender, a dummy indicating German
as the native language, and the questionnaire answers to the risk and morality questions.
The results are also robust to estimating two-censored Tobit regressions (specifications
(III) and (IV) ) which account for the fact that subjects were restricted by borrowing
constraints, i.e., they could only invest their total income but not more, and they could
not short the lottery.
As expected, males and subjects who are characterized as risk seeking invest a larger
share of income in the lottery. These estimates are in line with the risk literature and
therefore support our claim that the lottery in the experiment captures risk behavior
well. For example, Charness and Gneezy (2012) find that males are more risk seeking
than women in laboratory experiments. We also find that older subjects invest a larger
share of income in the lottery. Although this estimate is statistically different from zero,
it is economically small.18
Table 3: Treatment Effects on Investment Behavior: OLS and Tobit Regressions
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Estimation OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
Labor −0.111** −0.102** −0.128** −0.114**
(0.054) (0.051) (0.063) (0.057)
Evasion −0.007 −0.018 −0.016 −0.027
(0.060) (0.061) (0.071) (0.070)
Full −0.035 −0.041 −0.058 −0.062
(0.061) (0.058) (0.073) (0.069)
Constant 0.381*** 0.261** 0.387*** 0.213
(0.044) (0.118) (0.053) (0.144)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 180 180 180 180
R2 0.028 0.176 0.030 0.219
Notes: OLS and two-censored (at 0 and 1) Tobit regressions based on equation 6. Dependent
variable is the share of first period labor income invested in the lottery. Treatment effects
are relative to the omitted control group without adjustment opportunities. Subjects in the
Labor and Evasion treatments had the opportunity to supply extra effort and evade taxes,
respectively. Full treatment indicates that both labor and evasion adjustments were available.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimations (II) and (IV) include a full set of control
variables (see Table 4 for detailed results). ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
18For details on the measurement of risk and morale see footnotes 14 and 15. The coefficients for all
demographic and attitudinal variables are reported in Table 4 in the Appendix.
18
5 Discussion
Our empirical analysis highlights three important findings: future labor supply opportu-
nity reduces risk exposure, access to evasion has no effect on exposure and, combined,
tax evasion nearly fully cancels the labor effect. This section of the paper discusses these
findings in the context of the existing theoretical and empirical literature. We also discuss
issues of internal and external validity of the experimental design.
5.1 Discussion of the Results
The existing theoretical literature suggests that proving individuals with a future income
source induces flexibility and background risk effects. While flexibility induces greater
risk exposure, background risks may cause current risk exposure to increase, decrease or
remain unchanged if individuals are risk seeking, risk averse or risk neutral, respectively.
Our findings are consistent with the theoretical results of background risk.
Consider the labor treatment effect. We argue that the future labor effort of-
fered both a means of flexibly responding to the outcome of the lottery and a source
of background risk. Flexibility stems from the ability to offset potential adverse return
realizations with additional income. Background risk stems from the low predictability
of performance in the labor task combined with the disutility of earning income. Al-
though subjects in the labor treatment knew ex-ante that they had an opportunity to
supply labor after learning the outcome of the lottery, the income associated with this
labor task was unclear for two reasons. First, the difficulty of the slider task implies that
subjects could only predict their labor income with large errors. This is confirmed by
the large standard deviations on labor effort reported in Table 2. Second, subjects had
150 seconds to complete the first labor task and 90 seconds to complete the second labor
task. We argue that this one minute difference in labor time, made it even more difficult
for subjects to accurately predict their future labor income based on the income earned
in the first labor task. The inability to accurately predict future labor income along
with the disutility of completing the labor task suggest that the future labor opportunity
acted as both a source of flexibility and labor income background risk. Because we find
that subjects in the labor treatment invested a lower share of income in the lottery, our
findings suggest that the background risk effect dominated the flexibility effect.19
19We are not the first to study the effect of flexibility on risk exposure in a laboratory setting. For
example, Gneezy and Potters (1997) find that flexibility does not increase risk exposure even though
they model flexibility differently than we do. In particular, they conduct a laboratory experiment where
subjects make a series of investment decisions. Subjects in one group make their investment decisions
for each period separately and receive feedback after each investment. Subjects in the other group make
investment decisions for multiple periods simultaneously, and they only receive feedback for each block
of investment instead of period by period evaluations. The results from their study show that the first
group, which has greater flexibility, exposed their endowment to lower risk. Gneezy et al. (2003) find
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Similarly, the opportunity to evade taxes also act as a source of flexibility and
background risk. In other words, individuals in the evasion treatment who lose the
lottery have the opportunity to underreport income for tax purposes. This lowers their
tax payment, increase their net income and thus allows them to recoup some of the
income lost in the lottery. At the same time, the probability of being caught and the fine
associated with evasion implies a source of background risk as well. Our results show that
flexibility and background risk seem to exactly offset each other; evasion opportunity has
no effect on risk exposure.
Finally, we find no evidence that having both evasion and labor supply opportunities
affect risk exposure. The treatment effect of 3.5% is not statistically different from zero.
This finding suggests that the effect of labor effort on risk exposure is conditional on the
presence of evasion. In other words, individuals with labor income background risk will
expose themselves to greater risk if they have the opportunity to evade taxes.
This result, along with the contrasting background risk effects in the labor and eva-
sion treatments further imply that the source of background risk matters. This conclusion
is supported by existing empirical evidence. For example, our evasion result is similar
to that of Klos (2004) who finds that a having a future investment opportunity has no
effect on current risk exposure. Our labor supply result is consistent with Gakidis (1997)
who finds that individuals with uncertain future labor income have lower risk exposure.20
This raises an additional question; why does the source of background risk matter? The
existing theoretical literature seems to be mute on this question.21
A possible alternative explanation for our results in the labor treatment is income
targeting. If subjects begin the experiment with a certain target income in mind, then
having an extra labor task would allow them to achieve that target with lower investment
risk. However, this explanation is inconsistent with the findings in the full treatment
where subjects also have a second labor opportunity. If the labor treatment results are
being driven by income targeting, then we would expect a fairly similar treatment effect
in the full treatment where subjects also have a second labor opportunity in addition to
the option to subsequently evade taxes. Instead, the risk exposure in the full treatment
is not statistically different from that of the control group.
similar results in an investment market.
20We are not aware of any laboratory studies of the effect of labor supply flexibility or labor income
background risk on current risk exposure. See Heaton and Lucas (2000) for a survey of other observational
studies with similar findings.
21Although we find this question interesting, addressing it requires additional design features that take
us away from the central research question of this paper. We therefore view this question as somewhat
outside the scope of the specific objective of this study, and believe it is best pursued in future work.
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5.2 Internal Validity
The results described above are based on data generated in a one-shot experiment using
a between subject design and four randomly determined groups that are identical ex-
cept for treatment status. Descriptive statistics of observable characteristics show that
the groups are balanced along observables. This suggests that randomization into groups
worked, which is crucial for identification in between-subject designed experiments (Char-
ness et al. 2012). Additionally, the experimental instructions for the different treatment
groups were identical in every aspect except for the opportunity to respond to the lot-
tery. Since investment decisions in all groups are made before subjects proceed to the
adjustment-stage, any differences in the outcome variable of interest, risk exposure, be-
tween groups are only driven by the knowledge about and anticipation of future (ex post)
adjustment possibilities. The number of participants in the experiment is relatively large
and we are able to rely on 45 independent observations per group because there is no
interaction among participants. We find no evidence that the experimental design choices
and parametrization induced extreme behaviors that conflict with standard theoretical
modeling approaches. For example, the lottery outcomes are not clustered on extremes
(0 or 1), which suggests that the resulting distribution of investment shares supports the
theoretical modeling of an interior solution. Furthermore, labor supply is strictly posi-
tive but not statistically different across treatments. Additionally, the labor task yielded
sufficient variation to support the idea of labor-income uncertainty.
5.3 External Validity
As with all economic laboratory experiments, there remains doubt about the external
validity of our results.22 One major concern is that the setting in the lab is abstract
and artificial. However, subjects in our experiment must complete a “real-effort” task for
which they earn money dependent on their performance. While not perfectly equivalent
to a naturally occurring environment, the effort task represents real economic choices
and is similar to many “real-world” labor tasks in the sense that it is annoying and
somewhat “painful”. We argue that the sense of ownership induced by the labor task
implies that subjects are more likely to make realistic choices in the investment stage of
the experiment, which is important for the external validity of our results. In order to
make the tax evasion decision as realistic as possible we used actual tax terminology and
announced to the participants that all tax revenue will be donated to the administration
of the City of Cologne. This latter feature mimics the spirit of taxes having no direct
beneficial impact. We avoided charitable institutions to induce as much neutral attitude
22See Levitt and List (2007) for a critical discussion of the generalizability of lab experiments. Falk
and Heckman (2009) offer a defense of most concerns, some of which are also discussed here.
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as possible.23
It is also often argued that the stakes in lab experiments are too small to interpret
the outcomes as realistic. This is unlikely to be true in our case because subjects earned
an average pay-off of EUR 13.13 in approximately 40 minutes, which corresponds to an
hourly wage of approx. 19.70 EUR/ 25.64 USD or almost eight full lunch meals in the
student cafeteria at Cologne University.24 Another concern is the reliance on university
students as participants. Many experiments with non-student populations find results
comparable to experiments with students (Charness and Kuhn 2011; Falk et al. 2012).
Furthermore, Alm et al. (2011) compare students to non-students in tax compliance
experiments and find that reporting responses of students to policy innovations are largely
the same as non-students in identical experiments and “real” people in non-experiment
environments.
6 Conclusion
While the literature acknowledges that labor supply flexibility and tax evasion opportu-
nities are likely to affect investment outcomes, there is little empirical evidence on this
relationship. Using a laboratory experiment, we examine if individuals who have the
opportunity to (ex post) respond to lottery outcomes through evasion and/or labor sup-
ply show different (ex ante) risk willing behavior than individuals without any response
opportunities. We find that the opportunity to supply extra labor has a different effect
on the willingness to take risks than the opportunity to evade taxes. While extra labor
opportunity largely and significantly reduces exposure to investment risks, tax evasion
has no effect. The joint effect of both forms of adjustment opportunity is negative but
not statistically different from zero.
Our study contributes to the tax evasion and finance literatures by identifying the
impact of tax evasion opportunities on risk exposure. While heterogeneous access to tax
evasion has been shown to affect labor supply elasticities with respect to taxes, income
distribution and social welfare, we know of no other study to examine the effect of tax
evasion on current risk exposure. Our results also contribute to the labor economic
literature by providing insights into the possible effect of the current incremental shift
toward greater flexibility in the labor market – e.g., flexi-week work schedules and work-
from-home initiatives – on risk exposure. We find that risk exposure is likely to decrease
23Tax morale research (Torgler 2007) finds that taxpayers are more likely to comply with the tax
laws if they believe that the tax revenue is spent transparently. Eckel and Grossman (1996) show that
dictators share more in dictator games if the recipient is the American Red Cross. Overall, we donated
EUR 465.20 to the City of Cologne.
24The show-up fee is equivalent to one meal. The cafeteria at University of Cologne is the most popular
spot for students to buy their daily lunch.
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if the added flexibility is accompanied by greater income uncertainty. Additionally, we
explicitly account for any possible interaction effects between labor supply and evasion
opportunities in our empirical design. Understanding these interaction effect is especially
important given that labor flexibility and income uncertainty is often bundled with tax
evasion opportunities (e.g., among the self-employed).
The results further contribute to the long standing financial asset puzzle; what ex-
plains the lower than expected stock market exposure of individuals. Our results suggest
that heterogenous access to additional labor income, tax evasion opportunities and their
interaction play a non-trivial role in determining risk exposure. This finding is both im-
portant and timely given a number of recent developments. For example, the increased
scrutiny of offshore accounts imply reduced tax evasion opportunities for many high in-
come individuals. Although this change may to lead to higher revenues, we show that it
is unlikely to affect risk exposure.
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Appendices
A Screens in the Lab Experiment
Figure 3: Screen showing the slider task
Note: Screen showing the slider task which was designed by Gill and Prowse (2012). In
the displayed screen, the subject positioned four sliders correctly and four falsely. She
currently works on positioning the ninth slider. 28 seconds are left in this round.
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Figure 4: Screen showing the investment decision
Figure 5: Screen showing the investment decision
B Distribution of Labor by Treatment group
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C Detailed Regression Results
Table 4: Treatment Effects on Investment Behavior: OLS and Tobit Regressins
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Estimation OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
Labor −0.111** −0.102** −0.128** −0.114**
(0.054) (0.051) (0.063) (0.057)
Evasion −0.007 −0.018 −0.016 −0.027
(0.060) (0.061) (0.071) (0.070)
Full −0.035 −0.041 −0.058 −0.062
(0.061) (0.058) (0.073) (0.069)
Age 0.009*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.004)
Male 0.098** 0.108**
(0.040) (0.047)
German −0.004 −0.012
(0.042) (0.046)
Tax Morale 0.004 0.004
(0.007) (0.008)
Risk (indiff.) 0.132 0.154
(0.087) (0.097)
Risk (seeking) 0.202*** 0.222***
(0.061) (0.065)
Constant 0.381*** 0.261** 0.387*** 0.213
(0.044) (0.118) (0.053) (0.144)
N 180 180 180 180
R2 0.028 0.176 0.030 0.219
OLS and two-censored (at 0 and 1) Tobit regressions based on equation 6. Dependent variable
is the share of period 1 labor income invested in the lottery. Treatment effects are relative
to the omitted control group without adjustment opportunities. Subjects in the Labor and
Evasion treatments had the opportunity to supply extra effort and evade taxes, respectively.
Full treatment indicates that both labor and evasion adjustments were available. Subjects in
the control group had no adjustment opportunities. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Estimations (II) and (IV) include control variables. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
30
D Original Instructions
The following pages display the instructions in German (original) and English (translated)
for the “Full Treatment” Group. The instructions for the other groups are the same but
exclude the parts which were not relevant for the respective group (these are available
upon request).
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Instruktionen 
 
Herzlich willkommen und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Experiment. Bitte 
kommunizieren Sie ab sofort und bis zum Ende des Experimentes nicht mehr mit den anderen 
Teilnehmern. Sollten Sie sich nicht an diese Regel halten, müssen wir Sie von dem Experiment 
ausschließen. 
Wir bitten Sie, die Instruktionen sehr aufmerksam zu lesen. Wenn Sie nach dem Lesen oder während 
des Experiments noch Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand. Einer der Experimentleiter wird dann 
zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Frage persönlich beantworten. Ihre Auszahlung und Ihre Entscheidungen 
werden vertraulich behandelt. Keiner der anderen Teilnehmer erfährt während oder nach dem 
Experiment, welche Entscheidungen Sie getroffen haben oder wie hoch Ihre Auszahlung war. 
Sie können in diesem Experiment Geld verdienen. Wie viel Sie verdienen, hängt von Ihren 
Entscheidungen ab und wird nicht von den Entscheidungen anderer Teilnehmer beeinflusst. Ihre 
Auszahlungen werden im Laufe des Experimentes in virtuellen Geldeinheiten, den Experimental 
Currency Units (ECU), angegeben. 5 ECU entsprechen 1 EUR. Ihre Auszahlung wird nach dem 
Ende des Experimentes in Euro umgerechnet und in bar an Sie ausgezahlt. Zusätzlich erhalten Sie für 
Ihr Erscheinen eine Teilnahmepauschale in Höhe von 2,50 EUR. 
 
Das Experiment 
Überblick 
Das Experiment besteht aus einer Übungsrunde und einer Auszahlungsrunde. Sie können in der 
Übungsrunde kein Geld verdienen.  
Die Auszahlungsrunde hat vier Phasen: 
Phase 1 (Arbeitsaufgabe 1): Sie erledigen eine Arbeitsaufgabe und erhalten dafür, abhängig 
von Ihrer Leistung, Geldeinheiten.  
Phase 2 (Investitionsentscheidung): Sie können Ihr in Phase 1 verdientes Geld entweder in 
eine Anlage mit zufälliger Auszahlung investieren oder aufbewahren. Sie entscheiden in 
dieser zweiten Phase, wie viel Sie investieren möchten. 
Phase 3 (Arbeitsaufgabe 2): Sie wiederholen die Arbeitsaufgabe aus Phase 1 und erhalten 
dafür, abhängig von Ihrer Leistung, zusätzliche Geldeinheiten. 
Phase 4 (Steuererklärung): Auf Ihr gesamtes Einkommen aus den ersten drei Phasen fällt eine 
Steuer an. In dieser vierten Phase des Experiments geben Sie eine Steuererklärung ab.  
Die Übungsrunde zu Beginn des Experiments dient dazu, Sie mit der Arbeitsaufgabe vertraut zu 
machen und umfasst daher nur die Arbeitsaufgabe. Alle Phasen des Experiments werden im 
Folgenden ausführlicher erklärt. 
Phase 1: Arbeitsaufgabe 1 
Sie erledigen an Ihrem Bildschirm eine Arbeitsaufgabe mit Hilfe der Computermaus. Die 
Arbeitsaufgabe dauert 150 Sekunden. Während der Arbeitsaufgabe erscheint ein Bildschirm, auf dem 
48 sogenannte „Schieber“ zu sehen sind. Jeder Schieber ist zunächst auf „0“ (Null) positioniert und 
kann von Ihnen verschoben werden. Sie können den Schieber mit der Computermaus auf jede ganze 
Zahl zwischen „0“ und „100“ verschieben. Sie können jeden Schieber so oft verschieben, wie Sie 
möchten. Sie erhalten 2,50 ECU für jeden Schieber, den Sie innerhalb der 150 Sekunden exakt auf 
der Nummer „50“ positionieren. Oben rechts am Bildschirm können Sie während der 150 Sekunden 
immer ablesen, wie viele Schieber Sie aktuell auf „50“ positioniert haben. Zusätzlich zu Ihrer 
Bezahlung für die korrekt positionierten Schieber erhalten Sie eine fixe Ausstattung von 2,50 ECU. 
 
Phase 2: Investitionsentscheidung 
Sie haben die Wahl, einen Teil Ihres Geldes oder Ihr gesamtes Geld, welches Sie in Phase 1 verdient 
haben, aufzubewahren oder zu investieren. Das aufbewahrte Geld steht Ihnen unverändert im weiteren 
Verlauf des Experiments zur Verfügung. Durch Investieren können Sie zusätzliches Geld gewinnen 
oder einen Teil Ihres Geldes verlieren. Das Geld, das Sie investieren, wird entweder verdoppelt oder 
halbiert. Beide Ergebnisse sind gleich wahrscheinlich.  
Nachdem Sie entschieden haben, wie viel Sie investieren möchten, wird ein Experimentator an Ihren 
Platz kommen und einen 10-seitigen Würfel mitbringen. Der Experimentator wird an Ihrem Platz 
auswürfeln, ob Ihr investiertes Geld verdoppelt oder halbiert wird. Zeigt der 10-seitige Würfel eine 
Zahl zwischen 1 und 5 (also 1, 2, 3, 4 oder 5), dann wird Ihre Investition halbiert. Wird eine Zahl 
zwischen 6 und 10 geworfen (also 6, 7, 8, 9 oder 10), dann wird Ihre Investition verdoppelt. 
Ihr Einkommen, das Ihnen im weiteren Verlauf des Experiments zur Verfügung steht, besteht also aus 
dem aufbewahrten Betrag zuzüglich des entweder verdoppelten oder halbierten Investitionsbetrags. 
Somit gilt abhängig vom Würfelergebnis für Ihr Einkommen: 
- Würfel zeigt eine Zahl zwischen 1 und 5:  
Einkommen = Aufbewahrt + (0,5 x Investition) 
- Würfel zeigt eine Zahl zwischen 6 und 10:  
Einkommen = Aufbewahrt + (2 x Investition) 
 
Phase 3: Arbeitsaufgabe 2 
Das Investitionsergebnis wird bestimmt und auf ihrem Bildschirm angezeigt. Sie erledigen danach die 
gleiche Arbeitsaufgabe wie in Phase 1. Diesmal erhalten Sie jedoch keinen zusätzlichen Fixbetrag. 
Außerdem dauert diese zweite Arbeitsaufgabe 90 Sekunden. Das Geld, das Sie in dieser 
Arbeitsaufgabe verdienen, wird zu Ihrem bisherigen Geld hinzuaddiert. 
 Phase 4: Steuererklärung 
Ihnen wird zunächst Ihr gesamtes aktuelles Einkommen angezeigt. Dieses Einkommen bildet Ihr 
Bruttoeinkommen, auf das eine Steuer von 30% fällig wird. 
Sie sind nun aufgefordert, eine Steuererklärungsentscheidung zu treffen. Dazu benennen Sie einen 
Betrag, der mit dem Steuersatz von 30% besteuert werden soll. Dieser genannte Betrag kann zwischen 
Null und der Höhe Ihres gesamten Bruttoeinkommens liegen. 
Nachdem Sie Ihre Steuererklärungsentscheidung getroffen haben, warten Sie bitte bis einer der 
Experimentatoren an Ihren Platz kommt. Der Experimentator wird einen 10-seitigen Würfel 
mitbringen und an Ihrem Platz werfen.  
Basierend auf dem Ergebnis des Würfelwurfs ergibt sich eines der zwei folgenden Szenarien für Ihr 
Nettoeinkommen, das Ihnen am Ende des Experiments zusammen mit der Teilnahmepauschale 
ausgezahlt wird: 
Szenario a) Der Würfel zeigt eine Zahl zwischen 2 und 10: 
Es wird nicht überprüft, ob Sie in Ihrer Steuererklärungsentscheidung Ihr Bruttoeinkommen 
vollständig angezeigt haben. Ihre Auszahlung (das Nettoeinkommen) setzt sich in diesem Fall aus dem 
Bruttoeinkommen abzüglich der Steuerzahlung zusammen. Dabei ist die Steuerzahlung der Betrag, 
den Sie in der Steuererklärung angegeben haben, multipliziert mit dem Steuersatz von 30%. Also:  
     Nettoeinkommen = Bruttoeinkommen – (angegebener Betrag x 0,30) 
Szenario b)  Der Würfel zeigt die Zahl 1: 
Es wird überprüft, ob Sie in der Steuererklärung Ihr vollständiges Bruttoeinkommen angegeben haben. 
Abhängig von Ihrer vorher getroffenen Steuererklärungsentscheidung, gibt es in diesem Fall für Ihr 
Nettoeinkommen zwei Möglichkeiten: 
- Ist der von Ihnen in der Steuererklärung angegebene Betrag gleich Ihrem gesamten 
Bruttoeinkommen, dann setzt sich Ihr Nettoeinkommen aus dem Bruttoeinkommen minus 
der Steuerverbindlichkeit zusammen. Also:  
                     Nettoeinkommen = Bruttoeinkommen – (Bruttoeinkommen x 0,30) 
- Ist der von Ihnen in der Steuererklärung angegebene Betrag niedriger als Ihr gesamtes 
Bruttoeinkommen, dann müssen Sie die volle Steuerzahlung basierend auf Ihrem 
gesamten Bruttoeinkommen zahlen. Außerdem fällt eine Extrazahlung an. Diese 
Extrazahlung errechnet sich durch den von Ihnen nicht angegebenen Betrag multipliziert 
mit dem Steuersatz von 30%. Also: 
 Nettoeinkommen = Bruttoeinkommen – (Bruttoeinkommen x 0,30)  
                                                                         – [ (Bruttoeinkommen – angegebener Betrag) x 0,30] 
 
Es besteht also eine Wahrscheinlichkeit von 10%, dass Ihre Steuererklärungsentscheidung überprüft 
wird. Dem Experimentator ist es selbstverständlich nicht möglich, einzusehen, ob Sie Ihr 
Bruttoeinkommen in voller Höhe angegeben haben oder nicht.  
Die von allen Teilnehmern insgesamt geleisteten Steuerzahlungen werden an die Verwaltung der 
Stadt Köln als Spende überwiesen. Ein Nachweis über die Gesamtspende wird Ihnen im Laufe der 
nächsten Wochen per Email zugeschickt. 
 
Schlussbemerkungen 
Am Ende des Experiments bitten wir Sie, einen kurzen Fragebogen auszufüllen während wir die 
Auszahlungen vorbereiten. Alle dort angegebenen Informationen, sowie alle während dieses 
Experiments erhobenen Daten, werden selbstverständlich anonymisiert und ausschließlich für 
wissenschaftliche Zwecke verwendet. 
Instructions  
 
Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment. From now on until the end of the experiment, 
please refrain from communicating with other participants. If you do not abide by this rule, we will have to 
exclude you from the experiment. 
We kindly ask you to read the instructions thoroughly. If you have any questions after reading the instructions 
or during the experiment, please raise your hand. One of the instructors will then come to you and answer 
your question in person. Your payment and your decisions throughout the experiment will be treated 
confidentially. None of the other participants is informed, neither during nor after the experiment, about your 
decisions in the experiment or your payment. 
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you earn depends on your decisions and is not affected by 
the decisions of other participants. During the experiment, your payments will be calculated in a virtual 
currency: Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 5 ECU corresponds to 1 EUR. After the experiment, your 
pay-off will be converted to Euro and given to you in cash. Additionally, you will receive a show-up fee of 
2.50 EUR. 
 
The Experiment 
Overview 
The experiment consists of one practice round and one payoff round. You cannot earn money in the practice 
round.  
The payoff round has four stages.  
Stage 1 (Labor Task 1): You will complete a labor task and, depending on your performance, earn 
money from this labor task.  
Stage 2 (Investment Decision): You can either invest the money that you earned in stage 1 in an asset 
with a random payoff or store it. You decide in this second stage, how much you want to invest. 
Stage 3 (Labor Task 2): You will repeat the labor task from stage 1 and, depending on your 
performance, earn additional money from this labor task. 
Stage 4 (Tax Declaration): You will have to pay taxes on your total income from the first three stages. 
In this fourth stage, you have to file a tax declaration. 
The practice round at the beginning of the experiment is meant to acquaint yourself with the labor task and, 
hence, only involves the labor task. All stages of the experiment will be explained in more detail below. 
 
Stage 1: Labor Task 1 
You undertake a labor task on the computer screen using the computer mouse. The task will last 150 seconds. 
During the task a screen with 48 so-called “sliders” appears on the screen. Each slider is initially positioned at 
“0” (Zero) and can be moved by you. You can move the slider to every integer between “0” and “100” via the 
computer mouse. You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as you wish. For each slider that 
you position exactly at the number “50” during the 150 seconds, you earn 2.50 ECU. During the 150 seconds 
of the labor task, on the upper right of the screen you are shown how many sliders you have currently 
positioned at “50”. In addition to your result for the correctly positioned sliders, you receive an additional 
fixed endowment of 2.50 ECU. 
 
Stage 2: Investment Decision 
You will be given the choice to store or invest some or all of the money that you earned in stage 1. The money 
that you store will be available unchanged in the future course of the experiment. By investing, you can gain 
additional money or lose some of your money. The money that you invest will be either doubled or halved. 
Both outcomes are equally likely.  
After you have decided how much to invest, an experimenter will come to your booth and bring a 10-sided 
die. At your booth, the experimenter will roll the die to decide if your invested money is doubled or halved. If 
the 10-sided die shows a number between 1 and 5 (i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5), then your investment will be halved. If 
it shows a number between 6 and 10 (i.e., 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10), then your investment will be doubled. 
Your income that will be available in the future course of the experiment hence consists of the stored amount 
plus the, either halved or doubled, investment amount. Hence, depending on the die roll, your income is: 
- Die shows a number between 1 and 5: 
Income = Stored + (0.5 x Investment) 
- Die shows a number between 6 and 10: 
Income = Stored + (2 x Investment)   
 
Stage 3: Labor Task 2 
The investment outcome will be determined and displayed on your computer screen. You will then undertake 
the same labor task as in stage 1. However, you will not receive an additional fixed amount this time. In 
addition, this second labor task lasts 90 seconds. The money that you earn in this labor task will be added to 
the money that you have earned so far. 
 
Stage 4: Tax Declaration 
 You will first be shown your full current income. This income is your gross income which is subject to tax of 
30%. 
You will now be asked to make a tax-declaration decision. To make this decision, you specify an amount 
which will be taxed at the tax rate of 30%. This reported amount can be between zero and your full gross 
income. 
After you have completed the tax-declaration decision, please wait until one of the experimenters comes up to 
your booth. The experimenter will bring a 10-sided die and roll it at your booth.  
Depending on the outcome of the die roll, you will face one of the following two scenarios regarding 
your net income which will be paid to you, along with the show-up fee, at the end of the experiment. 
Scenario a)      The die shows a number between 2 and 10:  
Your tax-declaration decision will not be checked to determine whether you specified your full gross income. 
Your payment (the net income), in this case, consists of your gross income less the tax payment. The tax 
payment is the amount that you reported multiplied with the tax rate of 30%. Hence:  
     Net Income = Gross Income – (Reported Amount x 0.30) 
Scenario b)      The die shows the number 1: 
Your tax-declaration decision will be checked to determine whether you reported your full gross income. 
Depending on your previous tax-declaration decision, there are two possibilities for your net income: 
- If your reported income equals your full gross income, then your net income consists of your 
gross income less your tax liability. Hence:  
                     Net Income = Gross Income – (Gross Income x 0.30) 
- If your reported income is lower than your full gross income, then you will have to pay the full tax 
liability based on your full gross income. In addition, you have to pay an extra amount. This extra 
amount is equal to the income that you did not report multiplied by the tax rate of 30%. Hence: 
 Net Income = Gross Income – (Gross Income * 0.30)  
                                                  – [(Gross Income – Reported Income) x 0.30] 
Hence, there is a 10% probability that your tax-declaration decision will be checked. The experimenter who 
comes up to your booth with the die, of course, cannot see whether or not you reported your full gross income. 
The total generated tax payments from all participants will be donated to the administration of the City of 
Cologne. A verification of the total donation will be sent to you via e-mail within the next weeks. 
 
Final Remarks 
At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire while we prepare the 
payments. All information collected through this questionnaire, just like all data gathered during the 
experiment, are anonymous and exclusively used for scientific purposes.  
 
 
